

Reverse Engineering Database Applications

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- Database Security is currently changing
- The (default) database installation is much more secure than 2 years ago
- Hacking newer databases is become more interesting
- Still ten thousands of unsecure DBs out there.
- Small amount of (public) exploits for the latest Oracle version (10.2.0.4, 11.1.0.7) if exotic components are not installed
- Many DBAs have started to harden databases (at least for new installations)

So the databases software itself is more secure.

But is the entire system in 2008 more secure than in 2006 ?

No !

Sample from a security audit:

- Fully patched Oracle 10.2.0.4, minimal set of Oracle components installed, all security patches applied
→ DBA did a good job
- Most database scanner would return "everything is fine"

But is it really secure?

No! By abusing a vulnerability in custom PLSQL code I found a way to become DBA:

- ```
exec dyn_plsql('begin grant dba to public; end;');
```

- Most of the custom / 3<sup>rd</sup> party databases applications (e.g. written in PLSQL or TSQL) are vulnerable \*

Reason:

- No special secure development training for the development team
- No special tools for source code analysis (e.g. from fortify)
- No review process
- No security training for software architects

\* Based on my experience

## Database Audit Target is changing

Instead of looking for the common database issues like

- Missing patches
- Unsecure DB configuration settings
- Too many privileges

It is now necessary to understand & review the database application itself because most problems are hidden there.

## Problems of reviewing a database

A deeper review of the database can become a problem because

- Documentation of the application is often
  - Not available
  - Too weak (not enough details)
  - Too big (if produced from a large consultancy, 1000+ pages)
- Just a small budget for the review
- Nowadays DBAs are not responsible for the application itself, only for the RDBMS
- Security / Audit teams have often only a limited knowledge in databases



# Reverse Engineering of the DB

To be independent from poor documentation, the best approach is to reverse engineer the database application

Comparing to RE of binary apps this is a low tech approach (but nethertheless quite successful)

2 main goals:

- Understand the architecture
- Understand the data model

# 1.Step: Understand the architecture

- Common DB architectures



Database independent

(e.g. J2EE application supporting various kind of DBs and AppSrv)



Database dependent

(e.g. using special features of the Database)

- The following examples are Oracle specific but other databases are quite similar and differ in the SQL statements

- Architects / developers do not use Oracle specific features
- Poor configuration (due to the limited knowledge in Oracle, missing patches, ...)
- Too many privileges (e.g. grant connect,dba to APP;)
- Re-Implementation of features which are already available in the database (e.g. job scheduling or auditing)
- ➔ Easier to understand for external auditors because only simple features / statements (Insert/Update/Delete/Select) are used
- ➔ More time must be spend on application level

## DB architecture – platform dependent

- Architects / developers are using Oracle specific features extensively
- Slightly better configuration (Developers are not interested in limited privileges)
- Often dedicated privilege concept
- ➔ Strong knowledge of Oracle needed
- ➔ More time must be spend on DB level

- The easiest way to find out, what type the application is using, just run a sql scripts which is checking the Oracle specific tables (WRH\$\_\* and object tables)

# Get overview of used objects

| DESCRIPTION                                                | COUNT        |
|------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
| Maximum Number of CPUs                                     | 8            |
| Maximum Number of Datafiles                                | 107          |
| Maximum Size of the Database (Bytes)                       | 140789227520 |
| Maximum Number of Concurrent Sessions seen in the database | 63           |
| Features [user/available]                                  | 24/86        |
| User [open/total]                                          | 451/514      |
| Tables [custom/total]                                      | 399/3830     |
| Procedures [custom/total]                                  | 4521/39032   |
| Java Classes [custom/total]                                | 483/17639    |
| Database Links [public/total]                              | 0/0          |
| Directories [total]                                        | 15/          |

# Get overview of used objects

```
select 'Procedures [custom/total]' as description,
(select count(*) from dba_procedures where owner not in
('PUBLIC', 'BI', 'CTXSYS', 'DBSNMP', 'DMSYS', 'EXFSYS', 'HR', 'I
X', 'MDSYS', 'OE', 'OLAPSYS', 'ORDPLUGINS', 'ORDSYS', 'OUTLN', '
PM', 'SCOTT', 'SH', 'SYS', 'SI_INFORMTN_SCHEMA', 'SYSMAN', 'SYS
TEM', 'TSMSYS', 'WMSYS', 'XDB', 'LBACSYS', 'ORAESB', 'ORAWSM', '
WKSYS', 'WK_TEST', 'MOBILEADMIN', 'B2B', 'DCM', 'DISCOVERER5',
'DSGATEWAY', 'OCA', 'ODS', 'ORABPEL', 'ORASSO', 'OWF_MGR', 'POR
TAL', 'PORTAL_APP', 'UDDISYS', 'WCRSYS', 'WIRELESS', 'WKSYS', '
WK_TEST', 'PORTAL_DEMO', 'ORASSO_DS', 'ORASSO_PA', 'ORASSO_PS
, 'EQSYS', 'EQ_TEST', 'FLOWS_040000', 'FLOWS_030100', 'FLOWS_
030000', 'FLOWS_FILES', 'ORACLE_OCM', 'DBUSER', 'INTERNET_APP
SERVER_REGISTRY', 'ODM', 'ODM_MTR', 'QS', 'QS_ADM', 'QS_CBADM'
, 'QS_CS', 'QS_ES', 'QS_OS',
'QS_WS', 'RMAN', 'SYSADM', 'XMLP', 'AURORAJISUTILITY
$', 'OSE$HTTP$ADMIN')) || '/' || (select count(*) from
dba_procedures)
from dual
```



- The easiest way to find out, what type the application is using, just run a sql scripts which is checking the Oracle specific tables

| NAME                                        | TO_CHAR(DBID) | VERSION    | FIRST_USAGE_DATE   | LAST_USAGE_DATE   | DETECTED_USAGES | AUX_COUNT | FEATURE_INFO                                         |
|---------------------------------------------|---------------|------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------|------------------------------------------------------|
| Automatic Segment Space Management (system) | 972469792     | 10.2.0.4.0 | 2008.8.12 16:22:45 | 2008.10.7 23:48:5 | 9               | 98        | (Segment Space Management: AUTO, TS Count: 98, Size  |
| Automatic Segment Space Management (user)   | 972469792     | 10.2.0.4.0 | 2008.8.12 16:22:45 | 2008.10.7 23:48:5 | 9               | 0         |                                                      |
| Automatic SQL Execution Memory              | 972469792     | 10.2.0.4.0 | 2008.8.12 16:22:45 | 2008.10.7 23:48:5 | 9               | 0         |                                                      |
| Automatic Undo Management                   | 972469792     | 10.2.0.4.0 | 2008.8.12 16:22:45 | 2008.10.7 23:48:5 | 9               | 1         | (Retention: NOGUARANTEE, TS Count: 1, Size MB: 3475) |
| Client Identifier                           | 972469792     | 10.2.0.4.0 | 2008.9.30 23:45:46 | 2008.10.7 23:48:5 | 2               | 0         |                                                      |
| Character Set                               | 972469792     | 10.2.0.4.0 | 2008.8.12 16:22:45 | 2008.10.7 23:48:5 | 9               | 0         | WEBISO8859P1                                         |

## Get overview of used features

```
select name,to_char(dbid),version,
first_usage_date, last_usage_date, detected_usages,
aux_count, feature_info
from sys.wri$_dbu_feature_usage
where first_usage_date is not null
```

Understand the data model

## Understand the data model

For this approach it does not matter if the application is database dependent or not. We try to understand what the application is doing

This can be done via

- Using tools
- Manual approach

- Special database tools like ERWin are able to generate an E/R-model from an existing database schema
- Depending of the size of the application this data model can be large & complex
- Disadvantage is the additional license which is needed and the time to generate and understand the data model

## Understand the data model - manual

- Look & analyze the table names
- Look & analyze the column names
- Look & analyze the function/procedure/package/ names & content

# User Management

- The first question should always be the question for the user management of the application

| Application Server                                    | Named Oracle Accounts<br>(common for special<br>Oracle products like<br>Forms and Discoverer) |
|-------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Using a custom table with a<br>column called password | Using the Oracle built-in<br>user management                                                  |
| (e.g. select<br>username,password from<br>app.users)  | (select username,password<br>from dba_users)                                                  |

## Find the user table with password info

- It's normally easy to find the table(s) containing the users passwords
- The most common technique is to create a table USERS (or similar), containing a column called PASSWORD (or similar)



# Find the user table with password info

```
SQL> select table_name,column_name from dba_tab_columns
where owner='OVS' and column_name like '%PASSW%';
```

| TABLE_NAME      | COLUMN_NAME           |
|-----------------|-----------------------|
| OVS_VM_GEN_INFO | VM_PASSWORD           |
| OVS_VM_GEN_INFO | VM_VNC_PASSWORD       |
| OVS_SITE        | FTP_UPLOAD_PASSWORD   |
| OVS_SITE        | FTP_DOWNLOAD_PASSWORD |
| OVS_USER        | PASSWORD              |
| OVS_AGENT       | MASTER_PASSWORD       |
| OVS_PARTNER     | PASSWORD              |
| OVS_SERVER      | LOGIN_PASSWD          |
| OVS_VM_VIEW     | OS_PASSWD             |
| OVS_VM_VIEW     | AGT_PASSWD            |

# Find the password in foreign languages

```
select owner,table_name,column_name
from dba_tab_columns
where ((
 upper(column_name) like '%PASSWORT%'
 or upper(column_name) like '%PASSWORD%'
 or upper(column_name) like 'PWD'
 or upper(column_name) like 'PASS'
 or upper(column_name) like 'MDP'
 or upper(column_name) like 'KODEORD'
 or upper(column_name) like 'PASSORD'
 or upper(column_name) like 'LOSENORD'
 or upper(column_name) like 'HASLO'
 or upper(column_name) like 'CLAVE'
 or upper(column_name) like '%SENHA%'
 or upper(column_name) like 'JELSZO'
 or upper(column_name) like 'SLAPTAZODIS'
 or upper(column_name) like 'LOZINKA'
 or upper(column_name) like 'HASLO'
 or upper(column_name) like 'WACHTWOORD'
 ...
 or upper(column_name) like 'CODVN' -- SAP
 or upper(column_name) like 'BCODE' -- SAP
 or upper(column_name) like 'PASSCODE' -- SAP
))
order by 1,2
```

## Find additional password information

- Passwords are not the only available in user tables only. Often parameter tables and URLs are also containing (plaintext) passwords.
- To store passwords of parameters in databases tables, most developers prefer the usage of a parameter or value table

table app\_param

| Param            | Value                      |
|------------------|----------------------------|
| Login_warning    | This is a secure server... |
| smtp_password    | really_good_pw2008         |
| Default_protocol | HTTP                       |
| Account          | Admin                      |
| pop3_password    | pop3pw                     |
| Account          | Adm                        |
| Color            | yellow                     |

# Sample: Passwords in parameter tables

## Oracle 11g

```
select a.additional_info,a.attr_tstamp, a.obj#
from sys.obj$ o,sys.scheduler$_global_attribute a
where o.obj#=a.obj#
and o.name='AGENT_REGISTRATION_PASSWORD'
```

## Oracle OID (MD5)

```
select a.attrvalue ssouser, substr(b.attrval,2,instr(b.attrval,}')-2)
method, rawtohex(utl_encode.base64_decode
(utl_raw.cast_to_raw(substr(b.attrval,instr(b.attrval,}')+1)))) hash
from ods.ct_cn a,ods.ds_attrstore b
where a.entryid=b.entryid
and lower(b.attrname) in
('userpassword','orclprpassword','orclgupassword','orclsslwalletpasswd',
'authpassword','orclpassword')
and substr(b.attrval,2,instr(b.attrval,}')-2)='MD5'
order by method,ssouser
```

# Find passwords in URLs

- URLs stored in the database are also containing (plaintext) passwords.

Table URL

| name                                                                | type |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| http://scott:tiger@10.11.112.33/data/xml                            | url  |
| https://remoteip.com/./hiddenlogon.asp?<br>user=system+pass=!secret | url  |
| ftp://guest:guest@/download/full/sw102.exe                          | url  |

- Sample: Oracle Workflow is using cleartext passwords in URLs

# Find passwords in Audit/Log-Tables

- Log and/or Audit-Tables often contain password changes and/or incorrect password changes

Table URL

| id  | logdata                            | date       |
|-----|------------------------------------|------------|
| 222 | Change_pw('user1','mypw1')         | 11.11.2008 |
| 223 | Create_user ('user77','start1234') | 11.11.2008 |
| 224 | Shutdown application               | 12.11.2008 |

- Sample: Oracle Data Vault is saving password hashes in the DVSYS audit tables

- Passwords are normally stored in the database in 3 different ways
  - Cleartext
  - Encrypted
  - Hashed

## Passwords encryption (Cleartext)

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- Cleartext password can be typically found in
  - old applications (older than 5 years)
  - Parameter/value tables
  - URLs



## Passwords encryption (Encrypted)

- Encrypted password can be typically found
  - If a reconnect to other systems is necessary (e.g. data retrieval)

In the database world there is often 2 custom functions called encrypt and decrypt. Even without the knowledge of the encryption algorithm it is possible to decrypt passwords using the decryption function

Sample:

```
select username, decrypt(password) from table1
```

# Passwords encryption (Hashed) - I

- Hashed password can be typically found in
  - Webapplication
- In most cases (unsalted) MD5 is used. Since 2007 some applications started using salt
- Sample:  
Oracle APEX (since 3.x) is using salted MD5 Hashes via a trigger.  
MD5(password || securitygroup || username)  
MD5('alex0admin')

## Passwords encryption (Hashed) - II

- By looking at the on-insert/on-update trigger and/or the hashing function it is possible to find out, how the salt is used
- If the password hash is generated at the application level, length of the hash & rainbow tables are quite useful to identify the hashing algorithm.
- The new dictionary bases rainbow tables can detect a lot of common hashing techniques

MD5(pw)

MD5(MD5(pw))


MD5(pw||'admin')

MD5('admin'||pw)

...

# Dictionary based Rainbow Tables

This is a new concept of precalculating password hashed based on dictionary files together with permutations. For a special user name (e.g. SYSTEM) or algorithm (like MD5) all password combinations ( $2^{34}$ ) are precalculated (computation time approx. 2 days). Looking up is much faster.



# Password Cracking via Graphic Card

Modern graphic cards from NVIDIA and AMD/ATI are using up to 800 processors to compute graphic effects. This processing power can be used to break passwords with an incredible speed.

End of 2007 the average speed for cracking MD5 password hashes on an average PC was approx. 5 Mill pw/s.

End of 2008 an average PC (with a newer graphic card like GeForce GTX 280) can calculate up to 900 Mill pw/s. Using Triple-SLI it is possible to achieve even 1.6 Billion pw/s.

# Password Cracking (MD5) via Graphic Card

| Length | cs |        | cs |        | cs |         |
|--------|----|--------|----|--------|----|---------|
| 4      | 26 | 0.01 s | 37 | 0.01 s | 62 | 0.03 s  |
| 5      | 26 | 0.02 s | 37 | 0.08 s | 62 | 1 s     |
| 6      | 26 | 0.3 s  | 37 | 3 s    | 62 | 1.1 min |
| 7      | 26 | 10 s   | 37 | 2 min  | 62 | 1.1 h   |
| 8      | 26 | 4 min  | 37 | 70 min | 62 | 3 d     |
| 9      | 26 | 1.8 h  | 37 | 43 h   | 62 | 187 d   |
| 10     | 26 | 47 h   | 37 | 67 d   | 62 | 31 yrs  |

BarsWF X64 + CUDA support, 850,000,000 hashes/second  
QuadCore 2.4 GHz + GeForce GTX280 XT  
<http://3.14.by/en/md5>

## Sample: Passwords in Oracle products

How many tables of the following Oracle products are containing password information?

DB, EBS, OID, OIM, SES, Lite, OVS, IFS

**> 115 different  
tables !**

Often set during the installation...



# Sample: Passwords in common Oracle products

sys.scheduler\$\_job, sysman.mgmt\_bcn\_txn\_http, sysman.MBMT\_RCVCAT\_CRED,  
sysman.mgmt\_rcvcat\_config, sysman.mgmt\_ob\_admin\_hosts, ods.ds\_bkpatrstore, ods.P1\_DS\_ATTRSTORE,  
ods.ct\_cn, ods.ods\_chg\_log , ods.DS\_BATTRSTORE, WKSYS.WK\$\_PORTAL, wksys.wk\$\_sysinfo,  
owf\_mgr.fnd\_dm\_product\_function\_syntax, owf\_mgr.fnd\_svc\_comp\_params\_b, dsgateway.portal\_properties,  
eqsys.eq\$\_data\_source\_param, eqsys.EQ\$\_DATA\_SOURCE\_VAL, eqsys.EQ\$\_HTTPAUTH, eqsys.EQ  
\$\_PORTAL, eqsys.EQ\$\_SYSINFO, eqsys.EQ\$\_CRAWLER\_CONFIG, MOBILEADMIN.CEQ\$USERS,  
mobileadmin.dm\$\_all\_providers, mobileadmin.users, mobileadmin.c\$\_etc\_passwd, sysadm.pho, sysadm.usr,  
sysadm.rgs, sysadm.UD\_CTUSERS, sysadm.UD\_DBAPP, sysadm.UD\_IPLUSER, sysadm.UD\_OID\_USR,  
dbuser.tbl\_users, sys.user\_history\$, sys.link\$, sys.user\$, WKSYS.WK\$\_HTTPAUTH, wireless.panamauser,  
wireless.studio\_domains, b2b.tip\_party\_rt, b2b.tip\_party\_t, b2b.tip\_party\_t\_aud, b2b.tip\_transportserver\_rt,  
b2b.tip\_transportserver\_t , b2b.tip\_transportserver\_t\_aud, orasso.wwsec\_person\$ ,  
orasso.wwsso\_psex\_user\_info\$, portal.opc\_subscribers, dsgateway.sbtdeliveryrule , portal.wwctx\_proxy\$ ,  
portal.wwutl\_ctx\_tx\_proxy\$, wcrsys.wwwcp\_browse\_url\$, orawsm.users, sysman.mgmt\_bam\_data\_hubs,  
sysman.mgmt\_bam\_isection\_datasource, sysman.mgmt\_sec\_info, sysman.mgmt\_url\_proxy, sys.scheduler  
\$\_credential, sysman.mgmt\_ob\_admin\_hosts, sysman.mgmt\_prov\_assignment, sysman.mgmt\_test\_prop,  
sysman.mgmt\_url\_proxy, flows\_030000.www\_mig\_access, flows\_030100.www\_flow\_fnd\_user,  
sysman.mgmt\_view\_user\_credentials, sysman.mgmt\_credentials2, ams.ams\_imp\_list\_headers\_all,  
apps.ams\_imp\_list\_headers\_vl, apps.ecx\_tp\_details\_v,  
apps.icx\_por\_item\_sources\_vl, apps.icx\_po\_user\_details\_v, apps.jg\_zz\_sys\_formats\_all\_b\_dfv,  
apps.pos\_po\_user\_details\_v, ap.ap\_transmissions\_setup, az.az\_instances, ecx.ecx\_doclogs,  
ecx.ecx\_hub\_users, ecx.ecx\_tp\_details, icx.icx\_por\_item\_sources, icx.icx\_failures,  
icx.por\_employee\_loader\_values, hr.irc\_pending\_data, applsys.fnd\_oracle\_userid, applsys.fnd\_user, ifssys  
\$\_cm.ifsccredentialmanager, wireless.pv\_panama\_user, b2b.tip\_party\_ra , ifssys\$\_cm.ifsccredentialmanager,  
sysman.mgmt\_view\_user\_credentials, sysman.mgmt\_aru\_credentials, orasso.wwsso\_sso\_user,  
orasso.wwsso\_appuserinfo\_t, orasso.wwsso\_appuserinfo\$, wf.ecx\_doclogs, consolidator.c\$\_etc\_passwd,  
sys.scheduler\$\_global\_attribute, ovs.ovs\_user, ovs.ovs\_partner, ovs.ovs\_site, ovs.ovs\_agent,  
ovs.ovs\_vm\_gen\_info, ovs.ovs\_server, ovs.ovs\_vm\_gen\_info, ...

- Many database independent applications are implementing their own privilege system.
- A tables contains a list, what user have what privileges on a database.
- By updating such a table it is possible to get additional privileges
- The Oracle-"Create View"-Bug can help if privileges are missing

| USER  | PRIVILEGE  |
|-------|------------|
| Admin | Admin      |
| P1111 | Callcenter |
| P1224 | Callcenter |
| P3342 | Supervisor |

## Create View Bug

- By using the following bug it is possible to insert/update/delete without having the right privileges.
- Oracle is fighting since 2 years with this issue and is fixing issues from time to time. Last patch from April 2008

- **Sample: - with readonly privileges only**

```
create view hackpriv as
select * from privileges
where user in (select user from
privileges)
```

```
update hackpriv
set privilege='admin'
where user='P1111'
```

- Many really old and/or database independent applications are implementing their own job scheduling system.
- An external application is reading commands from table and executes these commands on the operating system
- This can be a really simple way to escape from the OS. Just update the table containing the executable and wait...

# Job / Scheduling Systems

| ID | Program           | Frequency     |
|----|-------------------|---------------|
| 1  | ls -a > /tmp/test | 0             |
| 2  | lpt -p test.prn   | 1             |
| 33 | Runbatch.sh       | 0,1,2         |
| 44 | Runnighly.sh      | 0,1,2,3,4,5,6 |

- To search for data inside the database my colleague wrote a script called `dbgrep.sql`. This PLSQL program is using search strings / regular expressions to look in every (suitable) table.
- This can be a way to search information like URLs, CC numbers, path entries in a large amount of tables.
- In most cases a manual check can be sufficient.

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